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CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR: TOUGH
QUESTIONS, HONEST ANSWERS, AND
INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO APPOINTIVE
JUDICIAL SELECTION
Steven Zeidman*
Judicial selection is a perennially hot topic.1 For as long as there
have been judges, there have been controversies about the way
they are selected.2 The longstanding interest in judicial selection
makes perfect sense given the central role the judiciary performs in
the American system of government. Many are rightly and passionately concerned with the manner in which we choose those
who will ultimately judge us and our actions. The debate, reduced
to its essence, centers primarily upon whether judges should be
elected or appointed. Typically, elections are preferred by those
who focus on the importance of judicial accountability to the citizenry, while appointments are favored by those who elevate the
goal of judicial independence.3
The judicial selection question is now hotter than ever.4 In 2002,
the United States Supreme Court waded into these treacherous
* Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law; B.A. 1978, State University of
New York at Albany; J.D. 1981, Duke University School of Law. I thank Mari Curbelo and Robert Mandelbaum for their constant support, suggestions, and patience. I
also gratefully acknowledge the support of the Professional Development Committee
of CUNY School of Law.
1. For a historical analysis of judicial selection in the United States, see, for example, Kelly Armitage, Denial Ain’t Just a River in Egypt: A Thorough Review of
Judicial Elections, Merit Selection and the Role of State Judges in Society, 29 CAP. U. L.
REV. 625, 628-37 (2002); Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting
Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 273, 274-76 (2002).
2. See, e.g., A.B.A., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 6-8 (2003) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN
JEOPARDY].
3. See, e.g., Martha W. Barnett, The 1997-1998 Florida Constitution Revision
Commission: Judicial Election or Merit Selection, 52 FLA. L. REV. 411, 413 (2000)
(“Appointive-based methods are seen as fostering more judicial independence, while
elections are credited with holding a judiciary more accountable to the electorate.”);
Symposium, Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case for Judicial Appointments, 33
U. TOL. L. REV. 353, 355 (2002).
4. A recent Lexis-Nexis search for the phrase “judicial w/2 selection w/2 method”
yielded fifty-six matches in the period from January 1, 2005 to the present. Included
in those matches were articles from states as varied as Georgia, New Hampshire, and
North Dakota. See, e.g., Patrick Emery Longan, Judicial Professionalism in a New
Era of Judicial Selection, 56 MERCER L. REV. 913 (2005); Mark C. Miller, Conflicts
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waters and struck down a rule prohibiting judicial candidates from
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues,5 and
the fallout from that decision is still settling.6 More recently, in
Lopez Torres v. New York State Board of Elections, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit jumped feet-first
into the judicial selection quagmire.7 The opening sentence of the
court’s eighty-two page opinion makes clear that the court was
knee-deep in the bog: “This case requires us to peer inside New
York State’s political clubhouses and determine whether party
leaders have arrogated to themselves a choice that belongs to the
people.”8 Ultimately, the court rejected the political leaders’ appeal of the district judge’s ruling that scrapped New York’s antediluvian, party-controlled convention system in favor of political
primaries.
Quite apart from the current appellate court interest in the subject matter, it is imperative that we focus on judicial selection for
its own sake. We are not talking about the rarified federal courts—
judicial selection in the federal arena is a fait accompli; all of those
judges are appointed and there is no movement on the horizon to
switch to an elective system.9 We are instead talking about state
court judges. The states employ a variety of systems to select their
judges,10 yet whichever system is utilized, it behooves us to do all
that we can to ensure that we are selecting the best and the brightest. These, after all, are the judges who daily decide matters such
as whether a child will be taken from her family, whether an acBetween the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Legislature: Campaign Finance Reform and Same-Sex Marriage, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 279 (2006); Renata Olafson
Selzer, Note, The Future of Judicial Elections in North Dakota, 82 N. D. L. REV. 197
(2006). Not surprisingly, there were also symposium and bibliography issues dedicated to judicial selection. See, e.g., Symposium, Judicial Professionalism in a New
Era of Judicial Selection, 56 MERCER L. REV. 913 (2005); Judicial Symposium Issue, 38
AKRON L. REV. 551 (2005).
5. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
6. See, e.g., Penny J. White, A Matter of Perspective, 3 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 5
(2004); Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection in
New York City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791 (2004).
7. 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006).
8. Id. at 169.
9. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Stephen P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty:
Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 696 (1995) (remarking that the prospect of electing federal judges is “unthinkable”).
10. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 3, at 412 (detailing Florida’s “hybrid system” of
judicial selection, incorporating both elections and merit selection); Bradley A. Smith,
Symposium on Judicial Elections: Selecting Judges in the 21st Century, 30 CAP. U. L.
REV. 437 (2002) (“Of the nation’s more than 1200 state appellate judges, 47% are
appointed, 40% face partisan elections; and 13% face non-partisan elections.”).
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cused will be held in jail, and whether a tenant will be evicted from
her home.
This symposium invited the participants to move beyond the
standard “election versus appointment” debate.11 Instead, all were
urged to “critically appraise” appointive selection—what exactly
are the component parts of a gold standard appointive system?
Designing a meritorious system is indeed challenging. In fact,
while the devil is said to be in the details, in this context, it may be
more apt to suggest that the devil is in the implementation.
This Essay, informed in significant part by personal experience,
examines in greater detail some of the common features of appointive systems, and in the process raises issues, concerns, and questions. Every step of the way the goal remains the same—to devise
an appointive system most likely to yield as outstanding a judiciary
as possible.
It is accepted wisdom that the nominating commission is central
to any appointive selection system.12 But who are the people who
will nominate potential judges for appointment by the executive or
other appointing authority? How and by whom should the nominators themselves be appointed? Obviously, the nominating commission members wield a great deal of influence. Certainly, the
commissioners must be independent. They should not be mere
puppets or act at the beck and call of the executive or whoever
appointed them to the commission.13
Similarly, it is now generally accepted that the commission must
be diverse, both to ensure the commission’s legitimacy by having
its membership mirror the population it serves, and to ensure a
vast depth and breadth of experience and wisdom among the com11. The symposium, titled “Rethinking Judicial Selection: A Critical Appraisal of
Appointive Selection for State Court Judges,” was held at Fordham University School
of Law on April 7, 2006.
12. See, e.g., Zeidman, supra note 6, at 831. This is apparently the case as well
internationally. See, e.g., Christine L. Nemacheck, Book Review, 16 LAW & POL.
BOOK REV. 664, 666 (2006), available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/
reviews/malleson-russell0906.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2006) (reviewing APPOINTING
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND
THE WORLD (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006)) (observing that the judicial appointment commission “is the most frequently used approach by countries revising their judicial appointment systems”).
13. See, e.g., James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the Organized Bar in
State Judicial Selection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REV. 683, 70708 (2002); Stephen Shapiro, The Judiciary in the United States: A Search for Fairness,
Independence and Competence, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 667, 673 (2001).
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missioners.14 It is not enough, however, to simply state that the
commission must be “diverse.” If we are to “critically appraise,”
we must ask hard questions. What is meant by a “diverse” commission? Is it limited to racial diversity? How about gender, sexual orientation, age, ethnicity, or any other so-called immutable
characteristics? What about other variables? Should the commission be split along political party lines? How about representing
different geographic regions (i.e., upstate and downstate, south
side and north side, etc.)? Should it have an equal amount of lawyers and laypersons? Just how should someone’s work history fit
into the equation?15
Inextricably linked to the diversity of the nominating commission is the diversity of the commission’s nominees. All of the questions above come to the fore with great force once again when
considering who is nominated by the nominating commission. Indisputably, there is a crying need to diversify the judiciary.16 The
numbers are stark. It is not hyperbole to say that we have a country of white male judges wholly disproportionate to their percentage of the general population.17 A sound appointive system must
be designed to overcome that national travesty, and yet must also
address the multitude of issues encompassed by the call for
“diversity.”
Perhaps even harder to address than the “who,” is the “how”—
what process the commission should use to bolster its efforts to

14. See, e.g., Jona Goldschmidt, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is Florida’s Present System Still the Best Compromise, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 67-68 (1994) (“There is
a nationwide trend to address the lack of diversity on the bench by explicitly adding
racial and gender diversity as a criterion for the selection of both nominating commissioners and judicial appointees.”).
15. See, e.g., Daniel Wise, Majority of Giuliani Appointments to Criminal Bench
are Prosecutors, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1999, at 1 (observing that Mayor Giuliani’s Advisory Committee on the Judiciary, comprised of many former prosecutors, recommended a super-majority of prosecutors for appointment to the bench).
16. See, e.g., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 2, at 11 (promulgating the principle
that “[t]he judicial system should be racially diverse and reflective of the society it
serves”); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and
Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 409-11 (2000) (noting that beyond
legitimacy and appearance, diversity on the bench will benefit judicial decision-making and promote fairness in the justice system); H.T. Smith, Toward a More Diverse
Judiciary, A.B.A.J., July 1995, at 8 (“Judicial diversity is more important today than
ever.”); Zeidman, supra note 6, at 811-18.
17. See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality
and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 95 (1997); see also
Zeidman, supra note 6, at 811-18.
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find and attract the best and the brightest.18 Two stalwart, standard
features of any nominating commission process are the reference
or background check, and the personal interview. As straightforward, common, and familiar as these devices seem, a critical appraisal reveals much more than meets the eye.
Most nominating commissions have some procedure whereby an
applicant is fully vetted. Part of that procedure will no doubt include reference checks. Commission members or designated individuals contact the applicant’s colleagues, adversaries, and judges
familiar with her work to gather information about the applicant.
What, though, is the underlying purpose of these efforts? What is
the reference check supposed to achieve? Is it designed to ferret
out that hopefully rare person who looks acceptable on paper but
has left a trail of scorched earth in her path? Is it, reduced to its
essence, aimed merely at skimming off the very worst—those who
cannot even pass a routine reference check? Or, is it supposed to
be more useful than that? Should it yield enough information so
that the commission will be able to rank applicants? For example,
if the references are asked a series of questions that require them
to give the applicant a 1-10 ranking, then their answers could be
used in a rough empirical way. This systemic, quasi-empirical
model is hard to imagine. It is difficult to conceive of reducing
these assessments to a series of numbers. Rather, these “interviews” are aimed at getting at subjective feelings and impressions—not the sort of endeavor readily capable of numerization.
Besides, what variables are the questions designed to address?19
How hard the applicant works? Whether she exhibited good judgment? Whether she has an even temperament? Even assuming we
might be able to agree on an amalgam of characteristics we would
like a judge to possess, could we get at those traits through this
process?20 In particular, your typical commission member is unlikely to be an expert, or even particularly skilled, in this informa18. One commentator suggests that “[i]mproving judicial selection is not just
about getting better judges but also about getting a better process.” Norman L.
Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection, 56 MERCER L. REV. 949, 954 (2005).
19. One commentator lists, inter alia, the following evaluative criteria: impartiality, industry, integrity, professional skills, community contacts, and social awareness.
MARLA N. GREENSTEIN, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS 69-71 (Kathleen M. Sampson, rev. ed. 2004); see also Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 29.
20. See, e.g., Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign Speech for Judicial 0ffice, 35 UCLA L. REV. 207, 253 (1987)
(“There are no ready-made measures to quantify judicial temperament, impartiality,
intelligence, tact, and the other qualities that constitute judicial excellence.”).
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tion-gathering technique. Is she trained to design the questions
(including the more spontaneous follow-up questions), solicit the
answers, and then analyze the responses across candidates?
From 1993-1996, the author had the privilege to serve on New
York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s Advisory Committee on the
Judiciary.21 Pursuant to an Executive Order, the Advisory Committee must include two members of the faculty from New York
City area law schools, and I was appointed to fill one of those
slots.22 While I had much experience and familiarity with the
workings of the New York City Criminal Court, I did not possess
any unique talent, or receive any special training, regarding how
best to select a judge. I did not know how to sift through the many
qualified applicants, and all the information their applications generated, to figure out who would make the best jurist. At the same
time, I actively served on the Central Screening Committee of the
Appellate Division, First Department, which was charged with reviewing applications from lawyers who wished to serve on the
panel of attorneys eligible for assignment to represent indigent defendants in the New York City Criminal Court. In each Committee, we struggled with the issue of performance evaluation—how
do you assess someone’s performance in her career, and how do
you predict how she will perform in the future in a new, and vitally
important, role? As a necessary first step toward that evaluation,
what information do you need to ensure sound decision-making,
and how do you accumulate or elicit that data? In some cases, I
called references, adversaries, and others with some knowledge of
the applicant’s work history. In other cases, I listened to reports
from those vested with the authority to conduct the background
check. Quickly, I came to realize that the legal community has its
own pinstripe version of the police department’s oft-noted “blue
wall of silence.” It was extremely uncommon for anyone to have
anything particularly critical to say. In short order I came to more
fully appreciate the phrase “damning with faint praise.” If a reference said that the applicant was “OK,” that seemed to hint at some
underlying issue. Unfortunately, the hint seldom led to the substantive subtext.
21. The Advisory Committee on the Judiciary, created by Mayoral Executive Order in 1978, recommends a list of candidates to the Mayor for vacancies on the New
York City Family and Criminal Courts. New York Mayor’s Exec. Order No. 8, Mar.
4, 2002 (on file with the author) (reestablishing the Mayor’s Advisory Committee on
the Judiciary).
22. Id. At the time, the author was on the faculty of New York University School
of Law.
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The standard interview with the judicial candidate raises similar
flags. On its face the interview is logical and necessary. When
“critically appraised,” however, it falls far short of its intended
goals. Again, we must first ask: What is the purpose of the interview? What are the interviewers attempting to discern? Is it a
search, via the time-honored technique of a face-to-face interview,
to determine whether the candidate exhibits a sufficient number of
judicially-required attributes in a sufficiently qualitative way? Is it
humanly possible to learn that in a typical thirty-minute or even
one-hour-long interview? Layered on top of those concerns we
must again ask whether the commission members have the requisite training, skills, or experience to enable them to achieve the
stated purpose of the interview.
While I had interviewed job applicants in the past, I had no special interviewing skill or training. The interview evoked the same
sense of futility as the vetting and reference check; it seemed to be
the right thing to do but in practice raised more questions than it
answered. The interview naturally and unconsciously devolved
into my own personal set of likes and dislikes. Try as I might to
pull myself back to the list of ideal judicial characteristics (i.e., integrity, industriousness, intelligence, temperament), I realized that
it became more about a general sense of the interviewee. Inevitably, I found myself thinking platitudes like, “I like her” or “She’d
probably make a good judge.” What were those impressions based
on? It is almost impossible for me to say.
Supporters of appointive systems and nominating commissions
must be honest—these information-gathering techniques require
great training, skill, and time. Most nominating commissions are
comprised of civic-minded, knowledgeable, experienced, hardworking, reliable, and serious people dedicated unstintingly to the
task at hand. That is certainly an apt description of my fellow commissioners. And commissions are becoming increasingly diverse.
Yet while the commissioners may possess an abundance of exceptional qualities, the real question is whether they are the most qualified people for this particular undertaking—are they best suited
for the delicate and challenging tasks of filtering through applications, vetting the candidates, conducting interviews, and identifying
those judicial aspirants who possess the right judicial stuff? In the
end, we must ask how we can select commissioners who, within the
necessary framework of diversity, are best able to perform the
commission’s stated task. Who are the best qualified to evaluate
who are the best qualified for the bench? That has to be the ulti-
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mate question: does the commissioner have the requisite skill set
for the vital task at hand?
Or, if we are truly taking judicial selection seriously, why not
turn to professionals, to the purported experts in the relevant
fields? After all, is it not hubris to think that a group of civicminded lawyers and laypersons are necessarily up to this incredibly
important task? Major firms, companies, and organizations have
already reached this conclusion. Rather than handle the search for
executives in-house, they turn to executive search firms—to professionals with training, education, and experience—who devote
themselves to these endeavors.23 Once the company identifies a
personnel need, it identifies the characteristics of the person they
are looking for, and then hands over the data gathering and analysis to the search firm.24
While not a scientific endeavor, surely there are experts who
know how to handle reference checks, ask questions, listen carefully to the responses, follow-up in ways designed to elicit even
more information, and interpret the responses they produce. The
burgeoning field of jury consultants provides food for thought.
Jury consultants help trial counsel prepare to question prospective
jurors. They design questions and analyze the resulting answers,
but more importantly they strive to ensure that the interviewing
technique and substance are well-adapted to the purpose of evaluating a potential juror on a number of personal characteristics.
Many jury consultants have studied these techniques in depth and
have graduate degrees in communications.25 In fact, many claim to
be able to assess jurors’ responses for subtext and nuance, and to
discern dishonest answers. Those skills are especially relevant in
the judicial interview as the commissioners seek to determine if the
candidate would be fair, impartial, and unbiased.26
23. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution Clauses in High
Stakes Employment Contracts, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 107, 124 (2002) (“The
growth and effectiveness of executive search ‘headhunter’ firms provide a type of
information specialist or broker in the market for highly skilled employees.”); J.
Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 115, 170 n.173 (1998) (citing Angela Ahn, Headhunters Battle Second Class Image, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 20, 1986, at 9) (noting the existence of more than
1,500 executive search firms).
24. For examples of major executive search firms and the services they provide,
see Heidrick & Struggles Home Page, http://www.heidrick.com; Korn/Ferry International Home Page, http://www.kornferry.com (last vsited Feb. 2, 2007).
25. See Diana G. Ratcliffe, Using Trial Consultants: What Practitioners Need to
Know, 4 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 32, 34 (2002).
26. See Jeremy W. Barber, The Jury is Still Out: The Role of Jury Science in the
Modern American Courtroom, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225, 1234-36, 1243 (1994) (re-
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At a minimum, it is time to reconsider the interview. A judge
occupies a unique position and possesses incredible power. The
interview must be tailored accordingly. The process demands new
and creative thinking. What about the use of role-plays, hypotheticals, and other devices to make it a more dynamic and interactive
process? What about giving written assignments or problems
ahead of time? Is it inappropriate to imagine multiple-choice, essay, and short-answer questions on a variety of legal and ethical
situations tailored to the particular court involved? The length of
the typical interview must also be re-examined. Twenty minutes?
A half-hour? One hour? Contrast the process for the appointment
of law school faculty. In most cases, the “interview” is a full-day
affair, the centerpiece of which is a presentation on a legal issue by
the candidate to the full faculty. The interviewee will have to respond to numerous challenging—if not hostile—questions, and defend her position with clarity and vigor. Is the job of a law
professor more demanding than a judge?
We must think seriously about pre-judicial training, education,
and certification as a prerequisite for appointment to the bench.27
In order to apply for appointment, a candidate could first have to
complete a rigorous judicial training program.28 Maybe she would
have to pass the course of study with high grades in order to apply,
or maybe the grades received would be considered as part of the
applicant’s qualifications. Or perhaps we should create a test like a
bar examination that candidates must pass as a precondition to applying for appointment. One can easily imagine multiple-choice
and essay questions designed to assess, inter alia, whether the applicant is familiar with the range of issues and problems of the particular court involved, and how those matters and the court itself
garding jury consultants’ ability to assess jurors’ responses to voir dire questions and
to uncover dishonesty); Rachel Hartje, A Jury of Your Peers?: How Jury Consultants
May Actually Help Trial Lawyers Resolve Constitutional Limitations Imposed on the
Selection of Juries, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 479, 499 (2005) (“As ‘prejudiced jurors rarely
broadcast their biases in open court’, the questions are purposefully designed to bring
out the subtle biases of potential jurors attempting to hide their true tendencies.”
(quoting Neil J. Kressel & Dorit F. Kressel, STACK AND SWAY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF
JURY CONSULTING 67 (2002))). But see Shari Seidman Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social Scientists Know and Do Not Know, 73 JUDICATURE 178, 180-81
(1990) (expressing skepticism about jury consultants).
27. See Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the
Back Room?, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1226 (2000) (suggesting that “states consider
developing special examinations to be administered to all judicial aspirants”).
28. The University of Nevada at Reno offers one of the few Masters and Doctorate programs in Judicial Studies. See Judicial Studies Program at the University of
Nevada, Reno, http://www.judicialstudies.unr.edu (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
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affects individuals and communities. Or maybe passing the course
and/or examination could simply be used as a highly valued credential in the applicant’s favor.
Rather than seeming farfetched, pre-judicial training and certification seems eminently logical. In fact, if we were devising a judicial selection system from scratch, unencumbered by the systems
already in place, isn’t it likely that we would create some kind of
judicial studies graduate school? While some bristle at the notion
of pre-judge “school,” examining the types of judicial selection
models the United States exports provides illumination. In places
such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine, the United States and
others are involved in creating and implementing a number of judicial training programs for judicial aspirants.29 Internationally, very
few countries elect their judges.30 Instead, the path to the judiciary
is through a process of rigorous academic and practical training.31
29. See, e.g., Thomas Wallitsch, Corruption, Lack of Resources Hobble Afghan
Courts, MORNING CALL, June 23, 2006, at A9 (detailing the Afghanistan Rule of Law
Project); State Department Documents and Publications, USINFO Webchat transcript, Jun. 14, 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/Archive/2006/Jun/14-98472.html
(detailing the efforts of the Department of Justice and the State Department training
judges in Iraq and Afghanistan); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN
AFFAIRS, ARAB JUDICIAL FORUM 2003: JUDICIAL SYSTEMS IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/24796.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2006) (detailing United
States involvement in the Arab Judicial Forum 2003); Int’l Legal Assistance Consortium, Iraq, http://www.ilac.se/default2.asp?xid=291 (last visited Nov. 16, 2006) (discussing the International Legal Assistance Consortium’s recommendations for
judicial reconstruction in Iraq).
30. See, e.g., Maria Dakolias, Court Performance Around the World: A Comparative Perspective, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 87 (1999). Professor Tarr has written:
In contrast with judges on ordinary courts in civil-law systems, members of
European constitutional courts are selected through a political process. In
some countries, such as France, political officials directly name the judges; in
others, such as Germany, the parliament elects the judges. Still other countries, such as Spain and Italy, employ a mixed system of selection, with some
judges named by the executive, some named by the judiciary, and some
elected by super-majorities in parliament.
G. Alan Tarr, Reform Proposals: Rethinking the Selection of State Supreme Court Justices, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1445, 1465-66 (2003); see also Nathan J. Brown, Arab
Judicial Structures: A Study Presented to the United Nations Development Program,
http://www.pogar.org/publications/judiciary/nbrown/tappoint.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2006) (discussing judicial appointment procedures in numerous Arab countries).
31. See, e.g., Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851,
869 (2002) (“Prospective judges in many other countries are trained for the demands
and responsibilities of judging at an early point in their careers . . . .”); John H.
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 848-49
(1985) (discussing the judicial certification process used in Germany); Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons From Abroad: Complexity and Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1, 8
(2001) (“In civil law countries, the judiciary is highly professionalized and judicial
aspirants elect a course of study in preparation to serve as a judge after the award of
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One final procedural issue serves particularly well to drive home
the importance of what is at stake. Suppose we have an appointive
system in place and the executive authority appoints a number of
judges to ten-year terms. What happens when their terms are up?
In the symposium’s spirit of focusing on appointive systems, I will
assume we are considering the reappointment process instead of a
retention election,32 and that we are not yet in a place where judges
are limited to serving just one term.33 How do we assess whether a
judge should be reappointed? While the use of a variety of judicial
performance evaluations to educate the public and the individual
judge is on the rise,34 the sad truth is that there appears to be much
less focus on actual judicial performance than on initial judicial selection.35 And while performance evaluations serve a utilitarian
purpose, they do not get to the heart of the matter—what standard
should be employed to evaluate whether a sitting judge should be
reappointed? Is mere competence sufficient? Or can we ratchet
up our expectations and ask whether the judge performed highly
academic degrees.”); Nemacheck, supra note 12, at 666 (discussing competitive exams
and specialized judicial training in Spain, Germany, France and Italy). Japanese
judges also attend educational programs:
[In Japan], aspiring lawyers typically study law at a university for four years
after completing secondary (high) school. They then take an exam and, if
successful, are admitted to a practical training program to become qualified
as judges. Practical training begins with classroom-type instruction in the
skills of a judge and continues with several-month apprenticeships at the
courts and other legal institutions. Following completion of this practical
training, students take a second bar examination.
James R. Maxeiner & Keiichi Yamamaka, The New Japanese Law Schools: Putting the
Professional Into Legal Education, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 303, 307-08 (2004).
32. Retention elections were designed as a way to make judges accountable to the
citizenry by allowing a popular vote on the performance of a judge selected pursuant
to a merit system. For trenchant discussions of retention elections, see, for example,
Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections: 1964-1998, 83 JUDICATURE 79
(1999); Honorable B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1429 (2001).
33. That was the position advocated by the American Bar Association’s Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 2, at 72-73.
Given the concern that judges might feel pressured at the end of their terms to assuage either the electorate or the appointing authority, the Commission recommended that judges’ tenure be limited to one, albeit relatively long, term. Id.
34. See, e.g., Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by
Use of Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1066-67 (2002)
(discussing the use of judicial performance evaluations to inform the public about the
judiciary and to inform judges about their strengths and weaknesses).
35. See, e.g., A. John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: Goals,
Practical Effects and Concerns, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643, 645 (1998) (“Historically, there
has been much less emphasis placed on a judge’s actual performance on the bench
after selection.”).
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competently? Let me suggest that we are asking the wrong question. Given the crucial nature of the judicial function, the ultimate
question must be whether there is anyone in the pool of available
applicants who might perform better. While that is sure to rankle
many—in particular sitting judges—the question sets an appropriately high standard for such an important job, and signals in clear
and certain terms that we take seriously our obligation to devise a
system that produces only the best and the brightest.

